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''A Question of Relevance'' 
The Establishment of a Canadian 
Parachute Capability, 1942-1945 
Bernd Horn 
'''T"he great trouble with starting anything 
J. new," argued Brigadier-General William 
Mitchell, "is to break away from the conservative 
policy of those who have gone before." 1 His 
observation was born from his own experience 
as a result of the inertia which existed in the inter-
war years. Not surprisingly, Canada did little 
during this period to ensure that it was capable 
of participating in a modern war. The vacuum of 
peace was insufficient to overcome the vacillation 
of military and political decision makers. It was 
only the stunning German victories of 1939-
1940, which provided the catalyst for change and 
a template of what a modern army required. 
Predictably, Canadian officers serving 
overseas in the cauldron ofEurope, in May 1940, 
formed distinct impressions of the new 
techniques of warfare which had been showcased. 
The use of airborne forces was one such 
innovation but proposals to establish a Canadian 
parachute capability were quickly rejected. The 
senior military command could not visualize a 
role for these special troops. More important, 
there existed an explicit institutional hostility 
towards the concept. Conventional military 
minds spurned the distinct, special or unique, 
and paratroops were seen as a distraction to the 
serious business of building an army. 
Nonetheless, the persistent efforts of Colonel 
E.L.M. Burns, greatly assisted by a growing 
American and British interest in airborne forces, 
eventually resulted in the organization of a 
modest Canadian parachute capability. The 
reason for this abrupt change is shrouded by 
inconsistencies. The relevance of a distinct 
Canadian airborne force was never credibly 
rationalized. The fact that at war's end it was 
quickly dismantled provided silent testimony to 
its perceived utility. 
This was the reality of the Canadian airborne 
experience. Despite the actual performance and 
unrivalled reputation of the nation's 
paratroopers, they never gained the full 
acceptance of the military establishment. This 
became the legacy of Canada's airborne soldiers. 
Their existence ebbed and flowed on the basis of 
political expediency and powerful personalities. 
The failure to rationalize a realistic need for 
airborne forces, and develop a doctrine which 
would guide their employment, would remain a 
weakness which would be the root of their 
eventual destruction. 
The Canadian indifference to parachute 
troops in the interwar period is not surprising. 
With the exception of Russian and later German 
experimentation, airborne ideas did not figure 
largely in the thinking of military commanders 
in Britain or the United States, much less 
Canada. However, this lethargy, which in England 
and in the United States was cloaked in a mantle 
of slow study and experimentation, was shattered 
by the chaos of events in Europe. British Air Chief 
Marshal Sir John Slessor recalled that the "bold 
and brutal" German airborne operations in 
Norway and the Low Countries, in the Spring of 
1940, deeply impressed everyone, notably Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill. 2 These events 
became the catalyst for action. 
As early as 6 June 1940, Churchill assailed 
his staff with proposals to develop a corps "of 
parachute troops on a scale of equal to five 
thousand. ":l Winston Churchill, himself an 
accomplished adventurer, journalist and soldier, 
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Early Training of Canadian Paratroopers: (clockwise 
from top left): Aspiring paratroopers conduct static line 
descents. Note the "Riddel .. football helmets and coveralls 
usedfor jumping; High tower training conducted to practice 
landings. Fort Benning, Georgia, Autumn 1942; A wind 
machine was used to simulate a parachutist being dragged 
upon landing due to an iriflated canopy on a windy day; 
Mock-up of a aircraft fuselage used to train Canadian 
parachutists the proper exit drills. Fort Benning. Autumn 
1942; Tower training used to practice exiting an aircraft. 
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held a heroic and romantic image of war. His 
concept of conflict was irretrievably moulded 
during the South African War of 1899-1902. To 
Churchill, the offensive was all that mattered. He 
believed that audacity and willpower constituted 
the only sound approach to the conduct ofwar. 4 
Churchill became the stimulus for the 
establishment of paratroopers in the British 
Army. However. it was not an easy task. 
Lieutenant-General Frederick 'Boy' Browning, an 
alacritous advocate for the establishment of 
British airborne forces, recalled, "Very early we C'-1 
came to certain definite conclusions which we 8 
0') 
have kept before us ever since and for which we ;::: 
may rightly say we have fought many a stout battle b: 
against the doubters and unbelievers: it is always CJ 
the same with anything new and there is nothing i 
curious about that."5 
The vehement resistance from the majority 
of Churchill's military commanders necessitated 
the Prime Minister's continual prodding for 
progress reports to ensure headway was being 
made. The opposition was initially so deep-
rooted, that Churchill suggested to Anthony 
Eden, the British Secretary of State for War, that 
a case should be made of "one or two" of the 
reluctant officers to set an example for the 
others.ri Nonetheless, the airborne detractors met 
with limited success. They convinced the Prime 
Minister to be satisfied, in the beginning at any 
case, with a parachute corps of five hundred men 
instead of five thousand. 7 
Not surprisingly, the Canadian record is 
similar to the British. As already noted, prior to 
the commencement of hostilities no effort. either 
conceptually or in practise, was expended in 
Canada in the investigation of an airborne 
capability. The idea of developing a Canadian 
parachute force was first raised by Colonel E.L.M. 
Burns, in August 1940, upon his return from 
England. 
Colonel Burns was recognized as a soldier 
of great ability and intellect, although one virtually 
without personality. 8 During the interwar years 
he was a prolific writer and actively participated 
in the academic debate on mechanization and 
the character of modern war. Despite his 
progressive ideas, Bums never contemplated the 
employment of paratroopers, or the use of air 
power to transport infantry tactically. 9 He did, 
Following the success of German paratroopers during 
the attack on the Low Countries in May 1940. E.L.M. 
Bums became a major advocate for the creation qf 
a Canadian parachute capability. 
however, share J.F.C. Fuller's notion of"motor 
guerillas" to conduct raids on the enemy's 
headquarters and lines of communications (the 
"brains and nerves" of an opponent's army). 10 
Thus, he demonstrated early on an appreciation 
for the importance of "Deep Battle." This would 
prove important to his later support of parachute 
troops. 
Colonel Bums' experience overseas, both on 
the Continent and in England, was instrumental 
to the eventual genesis of a Canadian airborne 
capability. His earlier writing demonstrated that 
he grasped the importance and utility of striking 
an enemy's command and logistical facilities. The 
successful utilization of German paratroopers in 
April-May 1940 now revealed a viable tool to 
accomplish this aim. Burns believed that "the 
successes obtained by the Germans with air-
borne troops seem to show that this will become 
a regular method of warfare. "11 
Of equal significance to Burns, in regard to 
the importance of the newly emerging airborne 
troops, was the subsequent parachute scare 
which erupted in the aftermath of the German 
aerial onslaught. The German Fallschirmjagers, 
by virtue of their stunning accomplishments, 
were quickly perceived by the military and general 
public as invincible. This created a wave of 
29 
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A most irrevocable first step. 
Paratroopers of 1st Canadian 
Parachute Battalion exit a 
C-47 Dakota. 
Airborne soldiering was very physically 
demanding. Only 30 percent of those 
volunteering to become paratroopers were 
accepted. Of those who passed. a further 35 
percent were lost during training. 
/ 
/ 
- --- ) 
Determined into 
battle. A 
paratrooper of 1st 
Canadian 
ParacluLte 
Battalion leaves 
the Drop Zone. 
1 
>I 
'\ 
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paranoia which infected the still unoccupied 
territories in Europe, as well as in Britain. As 
the remnants of the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) and the 1st Canadian Division hastily 
retreated to England, the threat of an imminent 
invasion loomed large. "Invasion," conceded 
Burns in his memoirs, "seemed fearfully close 
in those days." 12 Inherent in that threat was the 
imminent spectre of German Fallschirmjagers 
dropping from the heavens. 
Even the ever fiery and optimistic British 
Prime Minister was not immune to the wave of 
anxiety which swept through England. Winston 
Churchill estimated the expected scale of 
airborne attack at approximately 30,000 
paratroopers. 1 ~1 In Britain, troop dispositions 
were tailored to counter the envisioned airborne 
invasion and vast amounts of scarce material was 
invested to this aim. The government adopted a 
policy in 1940 to safeguard the country by 
ordering all open spaces (meaning virtually every 
park and playing field) all over Britain to be 
seeded with long spiked poles, concrete blocks 
and other obstacles which would impede 
paratroopers. 14 
The Canadian Expeditionary Force in 
England. now tasked with the defence of the 
British Isles, was also very conscious of the 
parachute menace. Canada's Overseas 
Commander, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. 
McNaughton stated that "invasion was a real 
threat," and the Canadians were in essence, "a 
mobile reserve with a 360 degree front. "15 He 
affirmed that they may have to operate anywhere 
in Great Britain to meet seaborne or airborne 
attacks. 
This chaotic and desperate environment 
deeply influenced Colonel Burns, when in July 
1940, he returned to Canada at the direction of 
Major-General Crerar, who himself was recalled 
to take over the position of Chief of the General 
Staff (CGS). Burns was appointed Assistant 
Deputy CGS. The CGS tasked Bums with special 
assignments concemed with the organization and 
development of Canada's Army. An all out effort 
now commenced. "With the fall of France," 
recounted Burns in his memoirs, "the limits 
which had been imposed by the previous cautious 
policy of Mr. Mackenzie King·s government were 
set aside, and the question now was: how much 
could we do within the limits of Canada's 
manpower and political situation to build up and 
train and equip those formations needed for the 
task?" 16 Burns' fertile mind, enhanced by his 
recent experience in Europe and Britain, now set 
to work on modernizing an Army for the new 
method of warfare. 
Colonel Burns wasted little time. He believed 
that parachute troops were "no longer just a 
'stunt,"' but rather, because of their mobility, an 
important element of any modern army. 17 On 13 
August 1940, he submitted his first proposal for 
the establishment of a Canadian airborne 
capability to Colonel J.C. Murchie, the Director 
of Military Operations in NDHQ. Murchie, 
dismissed the idea. He expressed the concern 
that "although the value ofthe parachute troops 
in certain situations was very great, the provision 
of such troops by Canada would be a project of 
doubtful value to the combined Empire war effort 
in view of the expenditure of time, money and 
equipment which would be involved." 18 Colonel 
Murchie further explained that any Canadian 
parachute units would likely be part of a UK 
Parachute Corps and as a result, be difficult to 
administer and more importantly, would be 
largely out of Canadian control during operations. 
He counselled that "if any additional 
commitments are accepted these should be 
limited to the formation of units to which 
Canadians are particularly adapted by reason of 
the nature of this country." 19 
The issue of national command remained an 
important one for Canadians during the Second 
World War. General McNaughton fought fiercely 
throughout his tenure to retain strict Canadian 
control. "We had to keep the command in our 
own hands," he insisted, "otherwise we would 
have had a succession of people coming in and 
the order and counter-order would have been 
similar to what we'd been through on Salisbury 
Plain in 1914."20 McNaughton recalled the 
struggle to claim national control over the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) during the 
Great War. Those successful efforts transformed 
the CEF into a distinct national entity. Its 
achievements fuelled national pride and a sense 
of collective accomplishment. As a direct result, 
over time the Canadian Corps became enshrined 
in the minds of Canadians. McNaughton was 
intent on applying that hard eamed lesson to the 
present conflict. 21 
31 
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Colonel Bums remained undaunted despite 
the initial rejection, as well as the larger issue of 
national command. He submitted a second 
memorandum to the CGS two weeks later. This 
time, Burns wisely reverted to a venerable 
Canadian approach when discussing a suggested 
increase to the nation's military capability. He 
cloaked his proposal in the mantle of home 
defence. He argued: 
In the defence of Canada against raids or a 
serious attempt at invasion. they would be the 
quickest means of building up a front against 
an attacker, and also could harass his 
communications. We have often thought of the 
problem of preventing an enemy from 
establishing a base for supplying submarines 
in remote sections of the coast which could not 
easily be reached by land. If we had even a 
battalion of Paratroops who could be landed to 
counter-attack such bases, it would make their 
establishment very much more difficult for an 
enemy; it would probably be necessary for him 
to send about a brigade of troops for land 
defences. 22 
Burns further attempted to sweeten the idea 
by emphasizing the stimulating effect that 
parachute training would have on the morale of 
the public and the armed servicesY The year 
1940 was a very low period for the Allies. Defeats, 
retreats and withdrawals, seemed to be all there 
was. Perhaps, Burns thought, the training of a 
corps of aggressive and inherently offensive-
minded paratroopers, could be a potential tonic 
to the war effort. 
General Crerar, although in apparent 
philosophical agreement with the concept of 
creating an airborne force, replied, "It is not a 
project of importance to the winning of the war 
just now."24 He directed that the matter be set 
aside and brought forward to his attention in 
three months time. Colonel Burns faithfully 
staffed yet another paper to the Chief of the 
General Staff on 12 November 1940. He 
reiterated the points from his earlier submissions 
and also emphasized the concept of paratroops 
in the form of an enhanced military capability. 
He asserted, "airborne troops are merely the 
most mobile form of land forces, and the fact 
that some of them land by parachute is due to 
the characteristics of the aeroplane."25 
Significantly, in an attempt to win support 
for his proposal, he linked his scheme to a 
32 
distinctly national orientation and theme. He 
explained that "Canada is often claimed to be a 
country essentially adapted to air transport-
witness development of the Northland." 
Therefore, "training air-borne troops." he argued, 
"would be a development in line with the 
emphasis on air training generally. "26 In this vein, 
he also suggested, that Canada might make a 
contribution in respect to the parachute training 
which was then being conducted in EnglandY 
Regardless of the varied approaches Colonel 
Burns used to sell his plan for a Canadian 
parachute capability, one key idea, which he felt 
was central to understanding the airborne 
concept, was repeatedly stressed. "We hope to 
turn to the offensive against Germany some day." 
explained Burns, "and it appears that full 
advantage must be taken of all forms of mobility 
in carrying out operations. "28 Unquestionably, to 
Burns, paratroopers represented mobility and 
offensive power. It also personified a modern 
army. He argued passionately that airborne forces 
"would be a step towards a 'quality' army, and 
would show that we were actually doing 
something to create a force with offensive 
capabilities. "29 
At this juncture, further exploration of the 
concept was pursued. Crerar directed that the 
views of both the War Office (UK) and the 
Overseas Commander (McNaughton) be solicited. 
The War Office promptly reported that parachute 
troops were in fact being organized and that one 
'special service battalion' was undergoing active 
training. The British concept of employment was 
explained as filling the role of Light Cavalry to 
"seize bridge crossings, defiles and aerodromes 
well in advance of the slower-moving main body 
of the army."30 Lieutenant-General McNaughton 
felt that the use of airborne troops had distinct 
possibilities. Moreover, he favoured the idea that 
Canada "should commence the organization and 
training of both parachute and glider-borne 
troops."31 However, he stated that he would 
acquiesce to Major-General Crerar's decision. 
Crerar in tum, proclaimed that he was "agreeable 
to a proportion (say a platoon) in each infantry 
battalion being trained in this work, [parachuting] 
[but] he is not in favour of training special 
airborne units unless the War Office make specific 
requests for them. which is unlikely. ":12 As a 
consequence no further action was undertaken. 
6
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In sum, Colonel Burns' aspirations at 
establishing a Canadian airborne capability were 
fraught with impediments. His attempts at 
marketing, and later repackaging, the need and 
utility of parachute troops met limited success. 
The greatest obstacle was the failure to convince 
the decision makers that a pervasive role, which 
was worthy of warranting the expenditure of 
scarce resources, existed. As a result, in late 
1940, the concept of an airborne force underwent 
a hiatus for the next eight months. In was not 
until the early part of August 1941, after Colonel 
Burns was promoted and sent overseas, that the 
idea resurfaced in the faceless tomb of National 
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). The re-
emergence is was inevitably linked to an Allied 
change of heart. The startling success of the 
German Fallschirmjagers, in their conquest of 
the Mediterranean island of Crete, prompted the 
British to adopt a more ambitious programme 
for airborne forces. An update from the War Office 
(UK) stated that a force of 2,500 parachutists 
was to be formed and it even implied that this 
number might be increased to a division-sized 
organization. '33 
The renewed attempt, however, was once 
again suppressed by the latent enmity to 
Left: The bicycle was considered one means of 
overcoming the airborne's Achilles' heeL, namely 
mobility. Pictured is Pte. Tom Phelan at the 
reinforcement camp of 1st Canadian Parachute 
Battalion as he recovers from wounds suffered 
on 16 June 1944 at le Mesnil, France. 
Above: Officers qf 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, 
Greven, Germany, 4 April1945. (L. tor.): Lt. W.A. 
Jenkins, Capt. P.G. Costigan, Lts. G.A. Menn, G.J. 
Fisher, A.O. Tucker. 
specialized troops who were perceived as lacking 
a credible role. General McNaughton, who left a 
previous impression, from the meeting in 
December 1940, that he was actually inclined to 
support airborne forces, now surprised many. 
In response to the latest submission he declared, 
"I do not advocate the establishment of any 
separate parachute troops in the Canadian 
Forces. "34 In McNaughton's view there was only 
two reasons which justified the creation of a 
special airborne force. The first was the 
probability of early and continued employment 
in a special role, and the second was the need 
for specialized training on lines greatly different 
from regular units. 35 
Despite the perfunctory rejection by the 
Canadian Overseas Commander, the renewed 
airborne effort lingered. Amazingly, the reason 
for the continued interest was not driven by the 
Army, but rather the Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF). In October 1941, the RCAF began to 
query National Headquarters in Ottawa in regard 
to the policy being considered in respect to the 
establishment of parachute troops. Furthermore, 
the Air Force staff officers relayed an offer from 
the Royal Air Force to provide instructors and 
equipment to assist the Army in the event they 
wished to proceed with training airborne forces.:16 
33 
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As no definitive answer was forthcoming, the 
RCAF continued to forward a stream of messages 
requesting an update on the Army's "airborne" 
policy. In January 1942, Major-General Maurice 
Pope, the Vice Chief ofthe General Staff(VCGS), 
directed that the effort be indefinitely deferred 
because the home army provided no scope for 
the employment of parachute troops. 37 An 
Appreciation on Air Landing Troops conducted 
the same month reinforced Pope's assertion. It 
declared that "parachute troops will not be 
considered except in passing. Our operations at 
home are largely static (coast defence), and, as a 
consequence, do not provide scope for the 
employment of parachute troops. "38 This belief 
became institutionally entrenched. The annual 
Army Programmes, for the period 1940 to 1944, 
included no mention of airborne troops. More 
important, in the discussion of forces for the 
defence of Canada, absolutely no reference was 
ever made to the employment of, or the 
requirement for, paratroopers. 39 
Remarkably, despite the repetitive assertions 
that parachute troops were oflimited relevance 
to the Canadian Army, a letter from Canadian 
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in mid-February 
1942 stated that, "the policy to be adopted by 
the Canadian Army with regard to paratroop 
training is [still] under consideration by NDHQ 
at the moment. According to our latest 
information no decision was to be given until this 
matter had been thoroughly discussed with Lt.-
General McNaughton. "40 Apparently, the 
continued efforts of the Royal Canadian Air Force 
kept the issue of airborne troops alive. It was 
not lost on the Air Force that paratroopers 
required aircraft. And more aircraft meant an 
expanded RCAF organization and role. 
Although the issue continued to simmer, little 
evident headway was made. In fact, the continuing 
resistance to establishing a distinct Canadian 
airbome capability was reinforced by none other 
than the Minister of National Defence (MND) in 
the spring of 1942. The Honourable J.L. Ralston 
explained in the House of Commons that "the 
formation of an actual paratroop unit is not being 
gone ahead with at the present moment, but 
rather the training of men so that they can be 
used as paratroops when the time comes, with 
additional training to be done with aircraft. "41 
The policy seemed consistent. So too was the 
34 
continuing non-action in regard to the "training 
of men" for paratroop employment. 
However, two months later the dyke broke. 
In early June, Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Keefler, 
from the Directorate of Military Training, NDHQ, 
was sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, to report on 
the state of parachute training in the United 
States. Coincident with the submission of his 
final report, were discussions with Air Vice 
Marshal Steadman of the RCAF, who had just 
returned from a visit with the 6th (UK) Airborne 
Division. As a result, Major-General Murchie, 
reversed his earlier position and forwarded a 
proposal to the Minister of National Defence for 
nothing less than the organization of a parachute 
battalion. 42 
Approval was not long in coming. The War 
Cabinet Committee gave its blessing on Canada 
Day 1942. Astoundingly, the purpose of the unit 
was conferred as home defence, specifically, "to 
provide a means of recapture of aerodromes or 
re-enforcements of remote localities by air-borne 
troops. "43 The apparent inconsistency seemed to 
go unnoticed. For years the rationale given for 
the rejection of a distinct Canadian airborne 
capability was based on its lack of relevance in 
regard to the Home Army. Suddenly, at the same 
time as the general strategic situation was 
beginning to improve for the Allies, it was 
professed that "the Army has a definite 
requirement to train one battalion of 600 
paratroops by 1st January 1943."44 A mere 
month later, an assessment on the Army 
requirement for gliders stated that a demand did 
exist for paratroopers, but only one company in 
strength. 45 Astoundingly, by early December 
1942, the demand changed again. Now the 
Directorate of Military Operations and Plans 
(DMO & P) envisioned the need of approximately 
1,000 personnel for airborne operations in 
Canada, exclusive of the newly designated 1st 
Canadian Parachute Battalion. 46 
The coherence of military thought is 
questionable. During the dark days of the war, 
when Britain was at its weakest, when the 
Commonwealth stood alone against the Axis 
juggernaut, and when Canada had little in the 
way of defensive forces, the mobility and rapid 
reaction capability of airborne troops was 
dismissed as irrelevant for use in Canada. A few 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Eadie inspecting "C" 
Company. 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, 
Kolkhagen, 24 April 1945. 
years later, when the tide of the war shifted in 
favour of the Allies, a decision was taken to 
develop airborne forces, incredibly for a home lrl 
defence role. ~ 
..... 
The key to understanding the paradoxical ~ . 
approach taken to the concept of a Canadian ~ 
airborne capability is not found in the "officially" 
stated role. One must look beyond the rhetoric ~ 
,:,j 
and words. There was little conviction, either er.: 
militarily or politically, that Canada faced a ::r: 
cj 
serious threat to its security. The home defence Z 
role for the parachute force was used merely to .8 
provide an acceptable rationale to convince ~ 
dubious military and political decision makers. 
Fraser Eadie, who became the last Commanding 
Officer (CO) of the 1st Canadian Parachute 
Battalion, affirmed that there was consistent 
opposition to the idea of a Canadian airborne 
element. He asserted that the Minister of National 
Defence finally agreed to the concept on the basis 
that the force was designated for home defenceY 
Despite the clear sales pitch, the definitive 
"raison d'etre" was far from transparent. There 
was never any question that the type of soldier 
required for parachute training was the 
aggressive individual who was anxious to serve 
overseas. In fact, the acceptance of National 
Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) volunteers, 
for the lst Canadian Parachute Battalion, became 
contingent on the respective individuals first 
joining the 'Active Force. '48 This cleared the 
"potential obstacle" of overseas service. 
Further evidence of the turbid state of affairs 
was given in early December in a note to the CGS. 
In this correspondence his Deputy insisted, "I 
do not consider that it is feasible at present to 
decide the ultimate role of the 1st Parachute 
B[attalio]n."49 Instead, he suggested that the unit 
continue its training, which was not expected to 
be completed prior to the end of March 1943, at 
the earliest. Not surprisingly, even before the 
newly formed parachute unit was deemed fit for 
active service, overtures were made to the War 
Office (UK) for its inclusion in a British airborne 
formation. Fraser Eadie, the former paratroop 
commander, recalled a telephone conversation 
during this period with Major Jeff Nicklin, the 
Battalion's Deputy Commanding Officer. Nicklin 
confided that neither the Canadian government, 
nor the Field Commanders in England, had any 
idea what to do with the paratroopers and as a 
result, they were being offered up to the British. 5° 
On 18 March 1943, General Paget welcomed the 
offer and stated the battalion could be included 
in the establishment of a second British airborne 
division which was forming. 51 
It became apparent that the issue of national 
control was a rather "hit and miss" notion in 
regard to a Canadian parachute unit. The latest 
turn in events also underscored another theme. 
Namely, in Canada, the ultimate aim was never 
to develop the airborne capability for use in the 
country's defence. That was merely a sop to 
placate the nay-sayers. The advocates wanted to 
use it in the active theatres of Europe. Indeed, 
airborne forces had become a symbol of modem 
warfare. Moreover, they represented the cutting-
edge of offensive action. The British, as a result 
of their study of German Fallschirmjagers, viewed 
parachute troops as "a highly mobile force of 
shock troops which can be projected at short 
notice into an enemy area which might otherwise 
consider itself immune from attack." They saw 
the airborne weapon solely in terms of the 
offense.52 
The emphasis on the "offensive" seemingly 
struck a chord with the Canadians. Colonel 
Bums' original argument was finally accepted. It 
is not coincidental that the decision to adopt a 
35 
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paratroop unit came at the same time that both 
the Americans and British were overwhelmingly 
committed to the large scale offensive use of 
airborne forces. The British authorized the 
establishment of an Airborne Division in 
November 1941. The Americans converted the 
82nd Motorized Infantry Division to the airbome 
role on 26 June 1942. 53 Furthermore, the 
airbome arm took on a public image of herculean 
proportion. The change in thinking was clearly 
reflected in the U.S. War Department's 1942 
Strategy Book which stated: 
The lJse ofParachutists ... Nowadays one cannot 
possibly hope to succeed in landing operations 
unless one can be assured of the cooperation of 
parachutists on a scale hitherto undreamed of. 
In fact, only the parachutist will be able to take 
enemy territory from the rear. thus preventing 
destruction of the attacking forces by artillery 
fire and enabling them to get a foothold on the 
coast .... 25,000 men set down in advance at every 
important point of attack should be able to do 
the work, especially if it proves possible to get 
them assembled. They must obviously be 
regarded as the pivot of success of the entire 
operation. 54 
An element of the Canadian military wanted 
to ensure they were part of the neophyte club. 
An eloquent War Diary entry belies the 
undercurrent of motive present. It elucidated, "We 
members of the 1st Canadian Parachute 
Battalion, are well aware of our unique position 
as a newly born unit in a new phase of warfare. 
We are therefore, confident of our success and 
trust that we well be given the opportunity to 
prove our value."55 Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.P. 
Bradbrooke, the first Commanding Officer of the 
unit, clearly explained his understanding of his 
battalion's purpose. He declared, "The 
paratroopers are the tip of the spear. They must 
expect to go in first, to penetrate behind enemy 
lines and to fight in isolated positions."56 To the 
military community, being a modern offensive 
minded army meant, rightly or wrongly, the 
possession of paratroops. Canada was now in 
the game. 
By March of 1943, Canada possessed a 
battalion of highly motivated and trained 
paratroopers, officially described as a "corps 
elite. "57 The spectre of actually employing them 
now became the issue. However, their official 
"raison d'etre," home defence, as the critics had 
always maintained, was not a requirement. As a 
36 
result, even before the battalion completed its 
collective training, or was declared operationally 
ready, it was not only offered up to the British, 
but was also warned offfor overseas duty. Despite 
the unit's imminent departure, it was still 
estimated that the paratroopers would need a 
further two months' training in the United 
Kingdom before the unit was fit for active service. 
This sequence of events further underscored the 
feebleness of the "airborne for home defence" 
role. But there were not too many who made the 
connection in wartime. 
If the rationale to justify the establishment 
of a parachute unit was questionable, the end-
product certainly was not. During the war the 1st 
Canadian Parachute Battalion fought valiantly in 
the Normandy Campaign, the Crossing of the 
Rhine, and during the pursuit of enemy forces in 
Northwest Europe. By war's end, the battalion 
had eamed a proud and remarkable reputation 
whose legacy would challenge Canada's future 
paratroopers and imbue them with a special 
pride. The Battalion never failed to complete an 
assigned mission, nor did it ever lose or 
surrender an objective once taken. The Canadian 
paratroopers were among the first Allied soldiers 
to land in occupied Europe and the only 
Canadians to have participated in the 'Battle of 
the Bulge' in 1944-45, in the Ardennes. 
Additionally, by the end of the war they had 
advanced deeper into Germany than any other 
Canadian unit. 
The unit's exemplary performance did little 
to guarantee its future. With the end of hostilities 
came the requirement for demobilization and the 
dilemma of deciding on a drastically scaled down 
peacetime force structure. The fate of the 
paratroopers was not difficult to predict. Once 
the paratroops had been 'transferred' to the 
British, they were for all intensive purposes 
abandoned by Canada. Lieutenant Ken Arril 
recollected, "we called ourselves the forgotten 
battalion. "58 Sergeant Art Stammers noted that 
the "Canadian Army forgot we existed. "59 The 
paratroopers at large felt no link with their 
national army and received no visits from its 
Commanders. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Eadie 
plaintively stated that "Canada had forsaken us 
for everything but pay and clothing. "60 The 
paratroopers were never fully integrated with the 
national army. In sum, they were orphans. 
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Once peace broke out, the enigmatic debate 
over a Canadian airborne capability began anew. 
The first indication was not promising. Beginning 
in May 1945 no training was conducted at the 
parachute training centre since Army 
Headquarters anticipated no requirement for 
airborne forces in the post-war army. 61 In the 
following months it became apparent that the 1st 
Canadian Parachute Battalion was in fact 
designated for disbandment. Its existence was 
prolonged only long enough to serve as an 
administrative tool to process the orderly release 
of those unit members who did not sign on to 
serve in the Canadian Army Pacific Force. 62 The 
unit was officially disbanded 30 September 
1945.63 Most of its members took their release 
a:nd rejoined the ·civilian world. For the 
paratroopers who remained in the Active Force, 
the question of continuing airborne service was 
anything but bright. 
The argument in regard to the relevance of 
an airborne capability in Canada had returned 
to its original position. Namely, there was no 
direct threat to Canada. Therefore, there was no 
need for specialized paratroops. A debt conscious 
government was aware that the war-weary public 
held little sympathy for continued defence 
expenditures or large forces. As a result, it was 
decided to establish an Interim Force for a two 
year period. This allowed the Department of 
Defence time to carefully craft the military that 
the government thought was sufficient to fulfill 
the nation's new peacetime requirements. 
Paratroopers were not part of that vision. The 
cessation of parachute training at Shilo and the 
disbandment of the only existing airborne 
battalion were clear signals. One glimmer of hope 
lay in the proposed.'Order of Battle' for the Post 
War Militia (Reserve Army) in June 1945. For 
planning purposes it included the possibility of 
a parachute unit being perpetuated in the form 
of a reserve infantry battalion, although no unit 
was specifically designated. 64 However, this 
thread was tenuous. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser 
Eadie, now in the capacity of a Reserve Force 
officer, actively pressed for such a commitment. 
He took his case to Major-General Church Mann, 
the VCDS, whom he had known during the war 
in 7 Brigade Headquarters. Eadie pressed Mann 
for the conversion to airborne status of his 
present unit, the Winnipeg Light Infantry. The 
VCDS' response was brutally frank. He stated 
that there was "no use for airborne" and went so 
far as to suggest that Eadie "was living in the 
past."65 
This was not a unique outlook. The post-war 
army was to be anything but extravagant. Mann's 
sentiments were also representative of an 
institution which was averse to the idea of 'elite' 
or 'special' troops. Furthermore, the military 
establishment failed to accept the premise that 
there was a credible and pervasive role which 
only the paratroopers could fill. This would 
become the legacy of the nation's airborne forces. 
Their fortunes would rise and fall like the waters 
of a turbulent river, dependent on political 
expediency and the support, or derision, of key 
personalities. Nonetheless, ultimately it would 
always become a question of relevance. 
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